Not long after, Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi issued Guerrilla Guideline II covering the organisation and disposition of the troops he led. The arrangement was as follows: the strength of troops in the city of Solo was one battalion, the strength of troops in regency towns (such as Klaten and Boyolali) was one section, and the strength of troops in small strategic places was at least one squad.
THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE ON THE CITY OF SOLO
The Government of the Republic of Indonesia returned to the city of Yogyakarta on 6 July 1949. This caused Dutch Forces to vacate the city of Yogyakarta and move east towards Solo. Thus the position of Dutch Forces in Solo became stronger and armed contacts with the guerrilla troops led by Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi often occurred.
To undermine the morale of the guerrilla troops, Dutch Forces shelled areas suspected of being the base of Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi’s troops with artillery fire. Then after being softened up with artillery, combat troops were moved in to clear the area.
In early August 1949, Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi was asked to surrender through a letter sent by Dutch Forces Commander Lieutenant Colonel Van Ohl, who was based in Bangak. This request was clearly not obeyed by Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi. At that time the strength of Dutch Forces was seven battalions (including three battalions that had retreated from Yogyakarta), with one battalion placed in the city of Solo, two battalions in Klaten, one battalion in Boyolali and the rest spread across several regencies. Meanwhile, the strength of TNI troops was six battalions plus three companies with fairly complete weaponry. With this balance of forces, Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Riyadi dared to organise his forces to launch a major attack on the city of Solo and its surroundings, even though on 3 August 1949 President Soekarno and A.H.J. Lovink, as the Dutch Supreme Military Commander, had ordered a halt to the shooting.






